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THE CHALLENGE AHEAD: INCREASING
PREDICTABILITY IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT
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PAUL R. MICHEL*
I am pleased to offer this introductory article for The American
University Law Review's annual volume devoted to recent decisions of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. By
producing this volume, the Review provides a service to the Federal
Circuit, its bar, government officials, commentators, and others.
Because The American University Law Review began publishing this
volume soon after the creation of our country's only federal appellate
court based on subject matter jurisdiction, it is the "review of record"
for the Federal Circuit. This year, as before, the many fine contribu-
tions to the volume manifest the high quality of our bar, as well as the
skill of the Review's staff. The thoughts presented in this Article,
however, should be attributed neither to the Review, to other
contributors to this volume, nor to the court. They are strictly my
own.
INTRODUCTION
By the start of its second decade in 1992,1 the Federal Circuit had
unified and clarified decisional law in the eight principal subject areas
Congress entrusted to this new, national, semispecialized court.2
* Judge, Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, appointed 1988; B.A., Williams College,
1963; J.D., University of Virginia Law School, 1966.
1. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982 by the Federal Courts
Improvement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. The court's specific grants of appellate jurisdiction are contained largely in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295, which covers, inter alia, the following subject matters:
a. patent, trademark, and related cases, § 1295(a) (1), (4), (8);
b. suits against the United States for money in the district court and in the United States
Court of Federal Claims (except cases under the Federal Tort Claims Act), § 1295(a) (2)-(3);
c. cases from the International Trade Commission, United States Court of International
Trade, and under the Tariff Act, § 1295(a) (5)-(7);
d. appeals in Merit Systems Protection Board cases, § 1295(a) (9);
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Clarification of once ambiguous doctrine may have gone about as far
as it can go. Unification has been concluded with the overruling of
aberrant rules. The court had also done much to bring litigation of
private patent cases, as well as government contract, personnel, and
Court of Federal Claims tax cases, more into the mainstream of
American civil litigation. Given the idiosyncrasies of each of these
specialized areas, the court has done about all that can be done.
Further simplification is not feasible, further integration not possible.
So too in the other smaller, but no less important, areas: internation-
al trade, trademark registration, veterans' benefits, and vaccine
compensation cases. According to commentators, the court has
completed this work successfully.'
Internally, the process of unifying appellate jurisdiction was
completed by merging together two specialized courts, the Court of
Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), each
unrelated to the ninety-four district courts, into one standard circuit
court that reviews district court decisions as well as those of some
twenty other tribunals. Along the way, the court gained control over
its growing docket-reducing the backlog and speeding disposi-
tions-through the leadership of former Chief Judge Markey and
former Chief Judge Nies, and through the industry of its individual
members. Despite repeated and significant additions of subject
matterjurisdiction, especially in 1988 and 1992,4 and increased filings
e. cases under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, § 1295(a) (10), (b), (c);
f. cases transferred from the now abolished Temporary Emergency Court ofAppeals (TECA),
which includes actions under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act of 1973, Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, and Energy Policy and Conservation Act,
§ 1295(a)(11)-(14).
In addition, Congress granted the court certain jurisdiction elsewhere, includingjurisdiction
over vaccine cases arising under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-
12 (1988), and cases arising under the Veterans'Judicial Review Act, 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (1988).
28 U.S.C. § 1295. For purposes of this Article, these grants are consolidated into eight principal
areas ofjurisdiction.
3. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1, 8-64 (1989) (providing thoughtful and comprehensive analysis of Federal Circuit's
performance); see also Donald W. Banner, Witness at the Creation, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 557,
562-63 (1992) (reviewing Federal Circuit's attempts to clarify and unify diverse areas of law);
Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit - A Reminiscence, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 513, 53143
(1992) (evaluating impact of Federal Circuit on eight areas of law).
4. Seesupra note 2 (providing citations for Congress' grant ofjurisdiction to Federal Circuit
over vaccine and veterans' benefits cases). In 1992, Congress expanded the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction to include appeals under § 211 of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1904 note (1988); § 5 of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-
760(h) (1988); § 506(c) of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1988);
and § 523 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6201 (1988). Pub. L. No. 102-
572, tit. 1, § 102(c), 106 Stat. 4506, 4507 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (Supp. V 1993)).
Congress transferred this jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit as the successor court to the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, which was abolished in 1993.
in its original areas, especially during the late 1980s,5 the court
presently has little more than a six-month backlog, which closely
approaches the American Bar Association's model for appellate court
dockets.6 On average, the court disposes of appeals in less than eight
months from filing, faster than nearly any other circuit court,
including the District of Columbia Circuit, its closest analogue as a
semispecialized court burdened with complex civil cases.' Basically,
the Federal Circuit is a story of success.
Nonetheless, I believe the court has failed in one respect. While
greatly improving doctrinal clarity and national consistency, we have
done little to increase predictability. By doctrinal "clarity," I mean the
clear articulation of the rules of law, the standards, and the tests. By
"predictability," I mean that the actual outcome of potential litigation
may be accurately forecast through the consistent application of
clearly stated legal principles to new factual situations. As to "national
consistency," it was achieved almost automatically once Congress gave
our court exclusive nationwide jurisdiction over certain types of
lawsuits.
Because five of the eight subject areas concern financial relation-
ships between legal or real persons and the Federal Government,'
predictability in the Federal Circuit may be unusually important, even
more so than clarity and consistency. Two of the three remaining
areas concern government grants of financially valuable rights in
patents and trademarks. Because at least in theory these grants are
governed by statutory criteria, the patentability of an invention or the
registrability of a trademark is a matter of entitlement.9 As with
other entitlements, it is imperative that all persons affected know their
rights and obligations, if any, as early as possible. That is, patent and
5. See REPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: THE
EIGHTH YEAR (1990); REPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRcurr: THE SEVENTH YEAR (1989); REPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: THE FIRST TWO THOUSAND DAYS (1988).
6. See Clerk's Office of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Inventory Control
Index for 1983 to 1993 (1994) (unpublished statistical compilation). The index is based on the
standard, established by the ABA Commission on Standards forJudicial Administration, that for
an appellate court to be current in its work, it should be turning over its inventory of pending
cases twice a year. The Federal Circuit figures fluctuate between six and seven months for
disposal of all pending cases.
7. See Clerk's Office of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Median Disposition
Times, 1983 to 1993 (1994) (unpublished statistical compilation).
8. These are claims against the United States, government contracts, international trade
cases, petroleum cases, and vaccine cases.
9. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) (providing that person is entitled to patent unless he or she falls
into one of several disqualification categories); 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988) ("No trademark by
which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused
registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless. . . .") (emphasis added).
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trademark examiners could more often make correct decisions at the
outset if Federal Circuit outcomes were more predictable. Similarly,
if trial level judges were able to predict what the Federal Circuit will
do, they could provide litigants with a correct decision earlier in the
process. Thus, in seven of eight areas, predictability is at a premium
for both the executive branch actors who initially decide matters and
for the business persons who must alter their behavior accordingly.
As I will endeavor to demonstrate in later sections of this Article,
however, predictability is even more important in the Federal Circuit's
eighth area ofjurisdiction, which encompasses private suits in district
court to enforce patent rights.
If the parties to disputes in all of the eight areas are able to
ascertain their rights and obligations prior to litigation by applying
rules set forth in precedent, they can alter their behavior accordingly.
After all, this is commercial law, which is very different from civil
rights, criminal, or libel law. In commercial law, parties can often
settle their disputes without filing lawsuits. Or, if the facts are
unclear, the parties may settle privately as soon as discovery is
completed.
In such a system, filings, trials, and appeals should be less frequent
than they are concerning the Federal Circuit today. In addition to
saving clients considerable time and litigation expense, such a body
of precedent empowers parties themselves to decide their futures,
rather than judicial officers who inevitably are less familiar with the
parties' circumstances and do not have the extra incentive of having
to live with the consequences of their decisions.
If the ultimate outcome of litigation were more foreseeable, these
commercial disputes would seldom require litigation. Indeed, most
disputes, much less the resulting lawsuits, could be avoided altogether.
Armed with the knowledge of the rights involved, the actors could
simply adjust their business behaviors to avoid transgressing one
another's rights in the first place, and they would have ample
economic incentive to do so.
Some observers, however, might argue that the costs of less
predictability are justified by the benefits of greater fairness. They
might tolerate inefficiencies in the operation of the adjudicatory
system in return for more just results, especially when an individual
person or even corporate business is squared off against the powerful
sovereign. While this may often be the case in the area of personal




I submit that in the eight areas of Federal Circuit jurisdiction,
Congress has reserved for itself much of the classical common-law
function of courts: creating legal rules and tests that in turn should
make rights and obligations ascertainable. Because most of the basic
policy choices have already been made by the legislature, often the
court's role is limited to reviewing whether a particular citizen was put
in the correct legal category by an executive branch or judicial
decisionmaker. This function may be analogized, rather unglamor-
ously, to resurveying a national border to confirm whether, based on
place of residence, one's citizenship was correctly determined.
Decisional danger then arises from the temptation, borne of
subjective sympathy for a party, to stretch the established border of
the more favorable "state" to include that party. I would argue that
except when equitable doctrines control, equities should not
determine litigation outcomes. While adjudication according to the
particular equities may benefit one party, it may also undermine the
larger system: in my analogy, large numbers of other residents
thereby become uncertain of their "citizenship." Predictability then
wanes, which can multiply litigation, and which can, in turn, decrease
predictability still further. Such a cycle can ultimately impede the
very commerce our court was created to promote.
I therefore argue that our court works best when it so defines
generic legal rights that, in most individual situations, the parties to
a potential lawsuit could, if willing, reason together and agree on the
likely outcome of prospective litigation. Specifically, the parties'
lawyers could reliably predict how our court would ultimately rule on
the matter in dispute. Surely, moving in the opposite direc-
tion-toward more uncertainty of rights, more unpredictability of
adjudicatory outcomes, and therefore more lawsuits-is an undesir-
able and ultimately an unsustainable result.
In the balance of this introductory Article, I illustrate my thesis with
several practices that I think foster needless uncertainty, and I suggest
several means by which the court could increase certainty. In the
articles that follow, other authors may help prove or disprove my
thesis as they survey the court's output over the past year. I begin this
analysis with patent laws because Congress created the court primarily
to improve that area of the law.
I. DESPITE A CLAIM-BASED SYSTEM OF PATENTING INVENTIONS, THE
SCOPE OF PATENT PROTECTION Is HIGHLY UNPREDICTABLE
Section 112 of the Patent Act establishes the claims allowed by the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) as defining the scope of the
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inventor's right to exclude others from making, using, or selling her
invention.'" Nonetheless, in nearly every infringement case, the
patentee also seeks, and often secures, a broader scope of protection
under the doctrine of equivalents where the claims as written are not
infringed." The court often allows juries to apply the doctrine with
little guidance. Indeed, the court often leaves the issue of the scope
of protection under the literal claim language of § 112 entirely to the
discretion of unguided juries. In both circumstances, predictability
decreases.
A. The Application of the Doctrine of Equivalents Is Too Uncertain
Although certain limitations on the doctrine 2 are well established,
they seldom seem to apply. Prosecution history estoppel 3 and the
rule against extending the scope of protection so as to invade the
prior art are decisive doctrines when they are applicable but irrelevant
when they are not.14 A third possible limitation on the doctrine of
equivalents is the rule that requires the extension of protection
beyond literal claim language to be within an "available range of
equivalents" that is somehow proportionate to the scope of the
claimed invention viewed against the prior art.'5 Thus, the more
10. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
11. See Kendrew H. Colton & Michael W. Haas, Patent Law Developments in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During 199Z 42 AM. U. L. REv. 909, 985-86 (1993) (defining
"doctrine of equivalents" as test in which equivalency results from insubstantial change that adds
nothing of significance to claimed invention).
12. See Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036,22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1526, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (tracing judicial limits placed on doctrine of equivalents); see also
London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538,20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1458 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (stating application of doctrine of equivalents is "exception ... not the rule").
13. See Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1173,
26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (defining "prosecution history estoppel" as
preventing patentee from later claiming infringement under doctrine of equivalents of subject
matter that corresponds to portion of claim that was surrendered during patent examination
process); Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
293, 296 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (describing how prosecution history estoppel excludes any
interpretation of claim that was disclaimed or disavowed during prosecution).
14. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 683, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that although doctrine of equivalents
permits some protection beyond literal wording of claims, it is prior art that provides outer limits
of expanded protection under doctrine). Under the doctrine of equivalents, a patentee should
not be able to obtain coverage that he could not have lawfully obtained from the PTO by literal
claims. Id. at 684, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948. The question then becomes whether a
"hypothetical" patent claim just broad enough to read on the accused device could have been
allowed by the PTO over the prior art. If not, then the patentee is not entitled to that coverage
under the doctrine of equivalents. Id.
15. See Sealed Air Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976, 984, 209
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 469, 477 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (holding that pioneer invention is entitled to broad
range of equivalents).
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pioneering the invention, the broader the protection." Unfortu-
nately, the utter vagueness of this third limitation has made it all but
useless to judges in deciding outcomes and to practitioners in
predicting them.
Uncertainty is further compounded when the element-by-element
equivalence test, which our court has approved en banc,' 7 may in
practice be bypassed in the trial court because the patentee may be
permitted to prevail by showing only overall equivalence. If the
patentee effectively avoids the element-by-element test, the patentee
can improve his or her chances of winning. Those chances, however,
remain uncertain, for even if thejury instructions are good, lay jurors
must struggle to grasp the meaning of such limitations as the
"available range of equivalents" and such tests as the "all elements"
test. When the jury instructions are poor, the jury's task seems
impossible. Even as a judge, I am occasionally baffled by the more
basic question under the doctrine of whether an accused device with
structurally different components nevertheless works in "substantially
the same way" under the third part of the Graver Tank test.'
8
Furthermore, because the court's instructions fail to construe the
claims literally, the court does not usually explain to the jury the
baseline from which protection would be equitably extended under
the doctrine of equivalents. Without a baseline, of course, there is no
way jurors, however bright, can possibly calculate the range of
equivalents sought beyond the scope of literal protection and decide
its "availability." Moreover, while the Federal Circuit has enjoined
trial judges and jurors from using the doctrine to "erase a plethora of
meaningful ... limitations,"19 the court does not tell them how to
discern which claim limitations are meaningful and which ones are
16. See Sun-Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978,987, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (asserting that wide range of technological advance between
pioneering breakthrough and modest improvement accommodates gradations in scope of
equivalency).
17. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1737, 1738 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied 485 U.S. 961 (1988) (setting out "all
elements" test). Under this test, each limitation must be viewed in the context of the entire
claim, and, in order to find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the plaintiff must
show the presence of every element of the claimed device or its substantial equivalent in the
accused device. Id.
18. Se Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (stating that
infringement may be found if accused device performs substantially same function in
substantially same way to achieve substantially same result); see also Pennwalt Corp., 833 F.2d at
934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738 (holding that meeting Graver Tank test does not necessarily
require finding of infringement by equivalents).
19. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
1994] 1237
1238 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1231
not.2 ° Additionally, some of our cases state that all limitations are
material and thus presumably "meaningful."21 For all these reasons,
jury findings are unpredictable concerning possible infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents, and certainty in applying the
doctrine is not appreciably higher in bench trials.
Hopefully, the en banc rehearing this year of Hilton Davis Chemical
Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.22 will yield a decision that reduces
uncertainty regarding the doctrine of equivalents. Because the case
is under review at this writing, I express no opinion about whether,
much less how, the doctrine of equivalents should be modified. It
may be justified in its present form by other virtues relating to fairness
to the inventor. It is not, however, justifiable on the grounds that it
assures predictability.
B. Even Literal Infringement Findings Are Unpredictable, Primarily
Because the Metes and Bounds of the Claim Are Seldom
Defined by the Trial Court
In the jury verdict appeals I have reviewed, I cannot recall even one
in which the trial judge defined the literal scope of the claim for the
jury in clear, comprehensive, and mandatory instructions, despite the
fact that this seems to be the duty strongly implied in our prece-
dent.2  Instead, judges routinely delegate the tasks of claim con-
struction, as well as infringement findings, to the jury. By acquies-
cence, however, the Federal Circuit has condoned this practice,
20. See id. (discussing claim limitations). The court stated:
One must start with the claim, and, though a "non-pioneer" invention may be entitled
to some range of equivalents, a court may not, under the guise of applying the
doctrine of equivalents, erase a plethora of meaningful structural and functional
limitations of the claim on which the public is entitled to rely in avoiding infringement.
Nor ... should a court convert a multi-limitation claim to one of two limitations to
support a finding of equivalency.
Id.
21. See Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1561, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1500,
1504 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
22. No. 93-1088, 1993 WL 502162 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 3, 1993) (pending rehearing en banc).
23. See Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1284,
1287 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (describing claim construction process). The court asserted:
[W]hen a question of infringement is given to ajury, there is a special burden placed
on the trial judge-as well as the parties-to ensure that the second step in the process,
that of comparing the claims to the accused product or process, does not cause the
first step, interpreting the claims properly, to get short shrift.
Id.; see also Unique Concepts, 939 F.2d at 1561, 1564, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503, 1505 (stating
that claim construction is issue of law, reviewed de novo, while determination of infringement
by accused device is issue of fact that in bench trial is reviewed under clearly erroneous
standard); McGill Inc. v.John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 672, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 944, 951 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) ("If, however, the meaning of a term of art in the claims is disputed and extrinsic
evidence is needed to explain the meaning, construction of the claims could be left to the
jury.").
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apparently on the assumption that the issue of claim construction is
somehow necessarily bound up with issues of historical fact. Some
argue that, much like statutory construction, claim construction is
usually a matter of defining the meaning of operative terms in a legal
document in light of the underlying official documents. 24 The
specification and prior art patents and publications of record are thus
the "legislative history" of the patent. No issue of historical fact is
present in many cases, as we impliedly recognized in McGill Inc. v.
John Zink Co.'
When the court delegates both construction and infringement to
the jury's discretion, the jury is free to do almost anything it wishes.
Whether this is good legal policy, good economics, or even faithful to
the Seventh Amendment are questions that will remain unanswered
here because they may be addressed by the court en banc in Pall Corp.
v. Micron Separations and Herbert Markman and Positek, Inc. v. Westview
Instruments,26 which will be reheard in 1994. For present purposes,
I simply note the lack of predictability when juries are left without
guidance to construe patent claims.
II. PATENT VALIDrIY IS OFrEN EQUALLY UNCERTAIN
Because the Federal Circuit gives little priority to the goal of
predictability, patent invalidity for obviousness, for failure to disclose
the best mode of practicing the invention, and for being on sale or
in public use for over one year before filing of the application are
areas that have become less, not more, certain as the court has
decided more cases. Previously, the inequitable conduct doctrine
24. See, e.g., Colton & Haas, supra note 11, at 909 (explaining that courts frequently refer
to patent's prosecution history to interpret its claims); Donald S. Chisum, Recent Developments in
Patent Laz--January 1 to September15, 199Z in3 CALIFORNIA MCLE MARATHON WEEKEND 13 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 804, 1993) (citing decisions suggesting that
jury may resolve disputes about claim meaning); V. Bryan Medlock,Jr.,Jury Trials of Patent Cases,
in PATENT LITIGATION 1990, at 115 (Patents, Copyright, Trademarks, and Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. 299, 1990) (suggesting that claim construction involves examining
claim language itself, specification, prosecution history, prior art, other claims of patent, and
testimony of expert witnesses as to how one of ordinary skill in art would understand terms);
Kenneth R. Adamo, Basic Motion Practicefor the Accused Infringer, 15 AIPLA QJ. 124, 172 (1987)
(explaining that when "'language of a claim is not disputed, then the scope of the claim may
be construed as matter of law.' But 'when the meaning of a term in the claim is disputed and
extrinsic evidence is necessary to explain that term, then... construction of the claim should
be left to the trier or jury under appropriate instruction.'") (quoting Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co.,
762 F.2d 969, 974, 226 U.S.P.Q. 5, 8 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
25. 736 F.2d 666, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 944 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
26. Pall Corp., No. 91-1393, and Markman, No. 92-1049, are companion cases pending
rehearing en banc.
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suffered from a similar lack of predictability.27 In 1988, our court,
sitting en banc, clarified the test by holding that the requisite intent,
for which a threshold quantum must be shown, is deception.28
Perhaps in the same way, the relationship between reduction to
practice and the possibility of subsequent experimental use could be
clarified. 29  Perhaps too the fog can be lifted from the question of
whether a patentee suffers invalidation only for deliberately conceal-
ing the best mode when unknown to other artisans,3° as opposed to
failing to disclose it when it is routine in the art.31
As to obviousness, which is a deep and vast subject that must await
exploration on another day, let me simply observe that, like the tri-
partite test of Graver Tank, the quadri-partite test of Graham v. John
Deere Co.32 can sometimes bewilder judges in its actual application.
For example, while the four factors under the fourth part of the
Graham test, such as commercial success, are advertised as "objective,"
27. Inequitable conduct requires a two-part analysis of materiality and intent. But the
relationship between materiality and intent was not always clear. Compare In rejerabek, 789 F.2d
886, 891, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 530, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (asserting that finding of gross
negligence mandates finding of intent for inequitable conduct purposes) with FMC Corp. v.
Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 n.9, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1112, 1116 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(stating that finding of gross negligence alone does not mandate finding of requisite intent).
28. See Kingsdown Medical Consultants v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1384, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (finding that inequitable conduct requires
showing of intent to deceive).
29. The experimental use exception negates the public use or on sale bar of 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1988), but the required sequence with respect to reduction to practice is unclear.
Compare UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1471
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that reduction to practice of claimed invention before critical date is
not required to invoke "on sale" bar) with RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1061,
12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that experimental use exception ends
upon reduction to practice).
30. SeeShearing v. lolab Corp., 975 F.2d 1541, 1545, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133, 1137 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (stating that to prove failure to disclose best mode, defendant must show both that
inventor contemplated better mode for practicing invention at time of patent application and
that inventor concealed that mode from public) (quoting Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus., 913
F.2d 923, 927-28, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036-37 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
31. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1209-10, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1016, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that best mode requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112
consists of two-part analysis). The court held:
The first is a subjective one, asking whether, at the time the inventor filed his patent
application, he contemplated a best mode of practicing his invention. If he did, the
second inquiry is whether his disclosure is adequate to enable one skilled in the art to
practice the best mode or, in other words, whether the best mode has been concealed
from the public.
Id.
32. 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459 (1966) (applying four-part analysis to determine
obviousness). The test for § 103 obviousness is a determination based on findings of: (1) the
scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and claims; (3) the
level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention; and (4) objective evidence of
nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 467
(1966).
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the ultimate question of what the hypothetical ordinary artisan would
have invented without undue experimentation had he known all
pertinent prior art can get rather subjective and elusive. I pity the
poor juror! Again, failure of the trial court to define the claims
compounds uncertainty. The Federal Circuit's insistence on reviewing
both PTO and district court obviousness determinations de novo only
further increases the inherent unpredictability in this area.33
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH UNCERTAINw ARE No LESS
HARMFUL FOR BEING INVISIBLE
A. Why Uncertainty Is Harmful
Although unpredictability is invisible, it pervades our case law and
harms not only particular potential litigants but also others in the
same industry. Uncertain litigation outcomes have several ramifica-
tions on technological invention. If an invention's patentability is
uncertain, individual and corporate inventors alike may elect not to
disclose it in a patent application that, under present law, becomes
public upon allowance. Instead, they may decide to maintain it as a
trade secret. Similarly, if the sustainability of a patent is uncertain,
the incentive to file is diminished, if not eliminated. As a result, the
benefit of disclosure of the invention, both as something others may
make or use (under license) and as a clue to further technological
advances, is lost. Even worse, a company assessing uncertain legal
outcomes may be sufficiently discouraged from investing in the
necessary research-often costing tens of millions of dollars-that the
invention is simply never made.
The same disincentives, also stemming from uncertainty, plague the
patentee's competitor. The competitor must ask, "Can I manufacture
my product without infringing another's patent? How can I know in
advance?" Even if no reasonable construction of the claims suggests
literal infringement, the competitor will still wonder whether the
court may nevertheless someday find infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents. Unless the competitor finds adequate assurances
against liability in an opinion letter from counsel, he may elect not to
market a product. The public may thereby be deprived of a signifi-
cant improvement. Thus, even though the patent law system is
33. See In reBeattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1311,24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1040, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(stating that determinations of obviousness in prosecutions are reviewed de novo, while
underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error).
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supposed to encourage improvements and "design arounds," 4 the
assurance of non-liability must outweigh the risk of liability and
related damages or the competitor will cease efforts to offer the
public better, or cheaper, devices.
Moreover, damages themselves may be both large and unpredict-
able. Of course, a finding of willful infringement can support trebling
actual damages. 5 Even a finding of non-willful infringement can
result in huge damages, partly because of the entire market value
rule 6 (even where only one component is patented), and non-
infringing associated products may support damages under the
doctrine of convoyed goods.
37
Aspects of these issues are at this writing before the court en banc
in King Instrument Corp. v. Perego8 and Rite-Hite v. Kelley Co.S9 For
that reason, I cannot comment further. But I can note that infringe-
ment findings also support both preliminary and permanent
injunctions that may lead to plant closings or even business failures.
On top of such potential catastrophic consequences, the competitor
must add the large and uncontrollable legal fees and expenses that
may be needed as a result of his activities. In addition, the competi-
tor may need to consider other costs, such as the cost to redesign the
product further versus the increased level of assurance that the
product successfully "designs around" the competitor, thereby
avoiding a dispute. If competitors view application of that rule as
uncertain, then the calculation may become too speculative. The
result again may be to deprive the public of desirable products. Who
34. See State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 418,
424 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (asserting that one benefit provided by patent system is "negative incentive"
to design around another's patented product, thus assuring steady flow of innovations to
marketplace). Although designing around patents to make new inventions is encouraged, piracy
is not. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456,
1458 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Hence, the doctrine of equivalents evolved. Id. Undeniably, tension
exists between these two doctrines. Id.
35. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988); seeBeatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing& Lithographing
Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1578, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that
although statute does not provide basis on which district court may increase damages, "'[i]t is
well-settled that enhancement of damages must be premised on willful infringement or bad
faith'").
36. See State Indus. v. Mor-Flo Indus., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026, 1031
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (defining "entire market value rule" as allowing recovery of damages based on
value of patentee's entire apparatus containing several features, where patent-related feature is
basis for customer demand), cent. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990).
37. Beatrice Foods, 899 F.2d at 1175, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023-24 (holding that scope of
damages is extended to cover separate unpatented products that are customarily sold along with
patented invention). This transaction is termed a "convoyed" sale. Id.
38. No. 91-1125, -1132 (pending rehearing en banc).
39. No. 92-1206, -1260, -1460 (pending rehearing en banc).
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can blame the businessperson for holding back when damages often
run into the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars?
Indeed, the businessperson may also need to factor in ftiture
changes and trends in court decisions, including trends in the Federal
Circuit, thereby creating triple uncertainty. First, the businessperson
must consider whether she can predict what the trial court would do
today. Second, she must determine what the court would do years in
advance when the possible lawsuit would actually be tried. Finally, she
must consider whether the ultimate decision on appeal, which likewise
is years away, is predictable.
Clearly, what both patentees and their competitors need is to
ascertain their rights and liabilities in advance. For that, they need
legal rules that foster maximum predictability of litigation outcomes.
Of course, in some circumstances, outcomes will never be predictable
because the facts will straddle the legal borderline. In others,
equitable doctrines will be dispositive. But if courts casually make the
legal line indistinct-an unmarked border-then the inherent
problem is greatly exacerbated. Even worse, if appellate rulings allow
a shifting borderline whose temporary placement depends on the
composition of the appellate panel, then the problem becomes
potentially paralyzing. Moreover, if the outcome remains unclear
until the final court has spoken, more lawsuits will likely ensue, as well
as more appeals.
B. Why the Ultimate Consequences of Uncertainty Are Invisible to Us
Both trial and appellate courts are limited to the record before
them for grounds of decision. Such records rarely contain much
information about the economic and scientific consequences of
possible adjudications beyond the lawyers' arguments. Because
attorneys for the opposing sides normally assert opposite practical
consequences, how is the court to assess them without a factual
record?
While Congress has made the broad choices, the Federal Circuit
necessarily "legislates," if only at the margin. Furthermore, with a
statute as general as the 1952 Patent Act,4" the court unavoidably fills
in gaps and develops fine points. We do so, however, without the
benefit of the testimony and documents about cause and effect that
are the staple of legislative committee hearings. The Federal Circuit,
like all appellate courts, must articulate general legal rules, principles,
tests, and standards that are intended to govern the results in other
40. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
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cases, both pending and future. Because we are a national appellate
court, today's decision, unless distinguishable, governs cases nation-
wide. Moreover, we receive less guidance from the Supreme Court
than do our sister circuits, for the Court rarely decides substantive
issues in our assigned areas.4 Finally, we lack a resource on which
I suspect the Supreme Court often relies: amicus briefs. These briefs
are the judicial equivalent of a legislative hearing record and are
submitted in connection with many appeals heard by the Supreme
Court.
Because our panels often cannot ascertain the practical conse-
quences of alternative grounds for decision, they may be tempted to
guess or to impose personal preferences or assumptions based on
prior personal experience that may or may not be accurate.
Consequently, results or rationales between opinions, depending on
panel membership, can vary greatly. Such dissonance is especially
likely to occur on issues of maximum vagueness, such as obviousness
and application of the doctrine of equivalents.
Moreover, we usually lack the elaborate development of a long line
of precedent, such as that on which the Supreme Court can usually
rely. Because the Court always sits en banc, every past decision carries
the full force of combined intellect behind it. There are thousands
of potentially applicable decisions rendered by the Supreme Court
itself. Accordingly, it has a firm and broad foundation of fully
reasoned and detailed opinions on which to build a sound decision
in a pending appeal. By contrast, the total body of Federal Circuit en
banc precedent is about fifty cases, and the court rarely rehears cases
en banc. While we have bound ourselves to follow the decisions of
both predecessor courts,4' which usually sat en banc, their jurispru-
dence is less helpful than might be assumed. The Court of Claims
adjudicated few patent infringement cases, and the CCPA, despite its
name, adjudicated none. The CCPA adjudicated only patentability,
not infringement, validity, or enforceability. The Federal Circuit,
therefore, receives little guidance from the Supreme Court and must
rely on a smaller body of en banc decisions than which is available to
our sister circuits. That the court experiences such inter-panel
dissonance is thus little wonder.
41. See Colton & Haas, supra note 11, at 912.
42. See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 n.2, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 657, 658
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (stating that holdings of Court of Claims and Court of Customs




Greater dissonance, however, may occur between some of our
decisions and technological, economic, or industrial reality. That
reality, which is a means for measuring the practical effects of a given
ruling, is usually missing from our records and, therefore, from our
minds. Again, comparison to Supreme Court decisional practices
proves instructive. The opinions rendered by the Court frequently
quote from journal articles and monographs, while ours seldom do.
I think the absence of such cites in our opinions is partly a result of
the fact that published analyses of patent issues are seldom based on
empirical studies. Of the innumerable articles on such topics that I
have read, I cannot recall one that was truly and fully empirical. Yet
on other legal topics, empirical studies abound and are frequently
cited and quoted by the Supreme Court. Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,43 for example, relies on sociological studies." Furthermore,
when ajournal article, empirical or not, is apposite, we seldom cite it.
Perhaps scholarly inquiry is deterred by the absence of recognition
from us.
Another aspect of invisibility is that patent rights are more often
manifested in licenses rather than in lawsuits. A public record does
not exist for the tens of thousands of private licenses in operation, or
the new ones taken each year. We thus cannot easily gain a sense of
how our rulings and rules affect licensing decisions. Yet such
business-legal decisions may be the best barometer of the practical
impact of our judicial decisions.
Lacking empirical studies, licensing data, amici briefs, Supreme
Court guidance, and extensive precedent on some issues from
predecessor courts, we all too often rely on dicta from prior panel
decisions that, upon examination, may have very little foundation.
With computer-assisted legal research behind their composition, most
briefs regurgitate this dicta in alarming quantities. In the absence of
vigilant judges, it can become precedent. The ultimate consequence
may be a kind of analytic sterility, a pattern of circular reasoning in
which groundless dicta in a prior decision becomes the grounds for
decision in a pending appeal. The practical consequences can all too
easily be ignored, overlooked, or forgotten.
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (citing psychological sources
as basis to reject previous psychological findings).
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IV. ANALYrIC STERILITY ALso THREATENS PREDICTABILITY IN
SUBJECT AREAS OTHER THAN PATENTS
Government contract law is an example of another subject area
threatened with a lack of predictability. The basic rule is that in the
face of ambiguity in contract language that we later deem "patent,"
the contractor who has failed to inquire about what the Government
really wants done will suffer the Government's preferred interpreta-
tion.45 By contrast, if two panel members later call the ambiguity
"latent," the Government suffers the contractor's preferred interpreta-
tion so long as it is reasonable.46 In short, the choice of label is the
choice of the victor. As a starting point for analysis in these cases, this
doctrine seems sound enough; but as an automatic "case decider," I
think it is difficult to defend. It appears from our contract caseload
that a great many government contracts contain ambiguities, and that
the patent/latent dichotomy frequently decides contract cases. Like
the equivalents test of "same way,"' the "latency test" may be highly
subjective-more in the eye of the beholder than grounded in
objective legal analysis based on precedent. Consequently, until our
court affixes a final label on the ambiguity, the contract dispute
cannot be settled. Thus, every such case threatens to go through the
full course of litigation. Does a rule that so deters settlement make
sense? Is a rule that is so subjective in its application good law?
Consider personnel cases. Removals from the federal civil service
are reversible if the penalty was "grossly disproportionate" to the
misconduct giving rise to it,4" but how is one to know? As I read our
case law, the term "grossly disproportionate" is undefined and hence
highly subjective. Again, it appears that this ambiguity encourages
appeals, first to the Merit Systems Protection Board and then to the
Federal Circuit, by any fired employee no matter how egregious the
misconduct or how reasonable the penalty because the penalty will
certainly seem disproportionate to the former employee. Consider
too terminations for incompetence. They are reversible unless the
criteria of acceptable performance were: (1) written out for the
45. See Fortec Constructors v. United States, 760 F.2d 1288, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(propounding ambiguity treatment standard).
46. Sturm v. United States, 421 F.2d 723, 727 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (discussing standard applied
to contractual disputes).
47. See Dolly, Inc. v. Spaulding & Evenflo Co., 16 F.3d 394,400, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767,
1773 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that accused device may infringe claim under doctrine of
equivalents if it performs substantially same function, in "same way").
48. Baker v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 912 F.2d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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employee in detail, and (2) as objective as possible.49 Unfortunately,
I can recall no cases that define those terms further. Thus, litigants
have little guidance as to how much detail or objectivity is required,
or even how one decides "how much." The danger then is that three
circuit judges scrutinizing the same factual record may measure it by
three different, subjective yardsticks.
In vaccine cases, we usually review the judgment of the Court of
Federal Claims after the judge has upheld the decision, the findings
of fact, and the legal conclusions of the Special Master.5" Our
standards of review ask whether the findings were arbitrary and
capricious, whether the legal conclusions were in error, or whether
the award was unreasonable.51 Typically, both petitioner and the
Government had presented medical experts whose diagnostic
conclusions conflicted. If that means the Master's findings by
definition cannot be arbitrary, our review is in vain. If it means we
must minutely examine the conflicting medical testimony, our review
is impractical and our competence questionable. Unfortunately, our
court decisions have failed to settle this conflict, with different
decisions pointing in different directions. 2 If this conflict means
that each panel may choose the review standard it prefers, such a
resolution is not good practice. If, as one decision may suggest, 3 we
are to decide whether the Court of Federal Claims abused its
discretion when it upheld the decision of the Special Master, then we
have convoluted our review by compounding deference. On the
other hand, if a decision simply repeats the review by the Court of
Federal Claims, it is wasteful. Given such uncertainty of review and
presumably of outcome, it is no wonder that so many vaccine
petitioners litigate at all three levels.
49. See Baker v. Defense Logistics Agency, 782 F.2d 1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12 (1988).
51. Munn v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 970 F.2d 863,870 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
52. Compare Bradley v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 991 F.2d 1570,
1574 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (upholding Special Master's finding on basis that it was not arbitrary
and capricious) with Hodges v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 9 F.3d 958,
960 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (allowing petitioner to submit medical testimony that conflicted with
Special Master's finding).
53. Hodges, 9 F.3d at 960 ("We may not disturb the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims
unless we find thatjudgment to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law.").
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V. DISSONANCE ALSO ARISES FROM THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE'S UNRESPONSIVENESS TO FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS
Although our en banc precedent is slight for infringement issues,
there is massive precedent for patentability issues. The CCPA nearly
always sat en banc and almost always reviewed decisions of the Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences, upholding rejections by
examiners, most commonly for obviousness. In its very first decision,
the Federal Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the
CCPA-thousands of cases spanning many decades.54 Later, in
Newell Cos. v. Kenney Manufacturing Co.,5 we were said to have
adopted twin rules: (1) that a binding precedent could never be
overruled by a panel, only by the court en banc; and (2) that of two
conflicting decisions, only the first is precedent.5 6 As commonly
interpreted, the combination of these two rules means that a CCPA
decision always trumps a Federal Circuit panel decision if they
conflict.
It is my impression that all levels of the PTO-the examiner corps,
the board, and the Solicitor-have taken considerable advantage of
this interpretation. Thus, the Solicitor commonly argues before us
that a Federal Circuit decision the PTO disfavors may be ignored
because it is said to conflict with a CCPA decision. 7 Because a
perception of conflict involves legal judgment, not everyone would
agree that a conflict exists. The Solicitor effectively takes the position
that if he or she can argue that a CCPA decision conflicts with a
disfavored panel decision, the latter may be disregarded. Where the
conflict is clear and the decisions irreconcilable, the Solicitor is
correct; but where neither is so, the propriety of this practice is, to say
the very least, open to question. Clearly, this practice creates
dissonance with daily consequences for applicants.
For several reasons, the availability of appeal to our court is not a
satisfactory safeguard. First, for various reasons particular to them,
some companies have a firm policy against appealing board decisions.
Some even decline to appeal examiner rejections to the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences within the PTO. Others may find
54. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 n.2, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 657, 658 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
55. 864 F.2d 757, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814
(1989).
56. Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg., 864 F.2d 757, 765, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1423 (Fed.
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989).
57. See In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
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the added expense and delay of appealing to our court unacceptable.
Even for those who always appeal, the question remains as to why they
should have to. If the claimed invention is patentable, the applicant
is entitled to a patent (because the statute says so)-not eventually, but
as soon as patentability can be determined. Moreover, the burden of
proof is on the PTO to show unpatentability, not on the applicant to
establish patentability, and it remains on the PTO even if the Solicitor
has made a prima facie case. 8 The only burden that shifts to the
applicant is the burden of production. 9 Is it not ironic that a
statutory provision that mandates issuance of a patent unless the
invention is shown to be obvious can always be applied so as to
require intervention by the Federal Circuit in a second-stage review
of an examiner's rejection? Where a Federal Circuit precedent
supports issuance, I would have thought the application should simply
be allowed by the examiner.
Two further observations are appropriate even in such a brief
discussion. First, the fact that the CCPA judges may be viewed as
"specialist judges" does not justify disregarding subsequent Federal
Circuit decisions, unless they cannot be reconciled with the CCPA
case. Federal Circuit appointees are "generalistjudges," like those of
all other circuit courts. Second, like other circuits, the Federal Circuit
operates in panels rather than as a full court (except for cases taken
en banc pursuant to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure).
There should be no confusion respecting the authoritativeness of a
panel decision: it is the decision of the court even though rendered
by only a minority of the court's judges. Unless the court convenes
en banc to rehear a case, the panel decision controls, represents the
final decision of our court, and constitutes a binding precedent.
VI. UNDUE RELUCTANCE TO DIRECT DISTRICT JUDGES FOSTERS
DISSONANCE
Categorical hesitance by the Federal Circuit to establish strict
guidelines for district judges is appropriate; undue reluctance is not.
Our reluctance to require trial judges to instruct the jury on the
proper interpretation of claims has effectively discouraged them from
so doing. According to our case law, however, claim interpretation is
58. SeIn reRijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1955, 1956, (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(stating examiner must affirmatively prove unpatentability) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443,
1445, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
59. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1444.
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fundamentally a question of law.' It is thus to be interpreted by the
judge, not by the jury.
In Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Industrial Products,61 the jury was not
properly instructed, and we remanded the case with instruction to the
court that it "should instruct the jury on what the claim means."
62
We also said in Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.' that "where the [c]ourt's
interpretation [of the patent claims] is not set forth in its instructions
to the jury, the [c] ourt must perform its role of deciding this issue of
law in ruling on the JNOV motion."' As far as I know, however, we
have never said, much less held, that it is reversible error to refuse to
instruct the jury on the meaning of claims. Thus, our basic holding
in Structural Rubber Co. v. Park Rubber Co.65 that "the issue of claim
interpretation [is] a matter for the [c]ourt to decide and to make
known to the jury by its jury instructions" is hollow.' Perhaps the
very absence of enforcement explains why trial counsel seldom
request such instructions.
Similarly, our reluctance to require bifurcation of the issue of
willfulness may have made validity and infringement opinion letters
of counsel incomplete and unhelpful, if not misleading. District
judges routinely enforce discovery of such opinion letters, even in the
prelude to a liability trial. While accused infringers may withhold
them upon assertion of the attorney-client privilege, the court may
normally instruct the jury that a negative inference as to their content
is permissible.6 7 Such letters, however, are usually irrelevant to the
issues of validity and infringement, the two most common liability
issues. They are relevant to possible enhancement of damages for
willfulness and in those cases they should be admitted only after
liability has been determined, thus justifying some form of bifurca-
tion.
Whether damages are to be decided by the same jury immediately
after liability or after appeal on liability by a new jury makes no
60. Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1564, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1500, 1506
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating claim construction issue of law that Federal Circuit reviews de noo).
61. 756 F.2d 1556, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 253 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
62. Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., 756 F.2d 1556, 1565, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 253,
262 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
63. 970 F.2d 816, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
64. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816,822-23,23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426, 1430 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
65. 749 F.2d 707, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
66. Structural Rubber Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707,721,223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1264,
1277 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
67. See Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1572-73, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1606, 1611 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that when patent infringer fails to produce
exculpatory opinion of counsel at trial, negative inferences are within province of fact finder).
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difference. Although opinion letters are usually relevant only to
willfulness, we hear that district judges regularly admit them into
evidence while infringement is still at issue. As a result, according to
some informal discussions, counsel now write them in a stilted way.
Our reluctance has thus unintentionally promoted an undesirable
interference in the provision of honest advice by lawyer to client.
Even if the client receives supplementary oral advice and is thereby
not actually denied counsel's full and honest opinion, this subterfuge
is unsatisfactory. In complex cases involving multiple corporate
actors, oral advice may constitute ineffective or inaccessible advice.
Additionally, material omissions from the opinion letter actually may
make the advice misleading. Should our court encourage deliberate
drafting of misleading documents that we know often become
evidence?
If this is the true state of affairs, it could easily be remedied.
Instead of merely hinting that bifurcation is appropriate in such
circumstances, we should require it. Otherwise, the accused infringer
is left with an unnecessary and perhaps unfair dilemma. If the
attorney withholds the letter to avoid making a finding of infringe-
ment more likely, and if the court then finds infringement, the
negative inference makes a finding of willfulness more likely.
Conversely, if to avoid the finding of willfulness counsel produces the
letter and it is admitted, it may indeed encourage the jury to
irrationally find infringement when it otherwise might not.
So our reluctance to require bifurcation in some form has
unwittingly spawned twin evils: stilted opinion letters and a dilemma
for defendants regarding letters written earlier. Both evils can be
avoided, but only if our court has the confidence to mandate
practices in trial courts on matters unique to patent trials.
VII. UNINTENDED DISSONANCE MAY ALSO ARISE FROM
LEGISLATION AND RESOLVING IT MAY REQUIRE BETTER
COMMUNICATION WITH CONGRESS
When Congress enacted the Contract Disputes Act in 1978,6 it
probably had no idea of the domino consequences that would result
from its failure to require claim certification by an authorized
signatory. Because of the wording of the Act and the implementing
regulation, a decade of decisions by the Court of Claims and the
68. Pub. L No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (1978) (codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1988)).
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Federal Circuit69 held that defective certification meant that no claim
in accordance with the Act had been filed and thus that the initial
arbiter, the contracting officer, lacked jurisdiction. 7' As a result,
there was no "final decision" required by the Act as a prerequisite of
appeal.71 Consequently, we have held that the contract boards and
the Court of Federal Claims also lacked jurisdiction,72 and because
they lacked jurisdiction, so did we. Moreover, because absence of
jurisdiction may be raised at any time by a party or sua sponte by a
tribunal,7 many cases are aborted in mid-litigation and have to be
refiled with the contracting officer. In the meantime, interest on any
recovery may be lost, and if the statute of limitations has run, the
entire claim may be lost.74 All of these adverse consequences
presumably were unintended by Congress when it enacted the
Contract Disputes Act in 1978.
The perceived problem grew steadily for eleven years and surged in
importance in 1989 with our court's decision in Ball, Ball & Brossame,
Inc. v. United States.75 It reached crisis status beginning in 1991 when
our court, following Ball, decided United States v. Grumman Aerospace
Corp.7  In 1992, as a result of decisions by the then-United States
Claims Court, as well as industry lobbying efforts, Congress amended
the Act prospectively to make certification defects non-jurisdictional
but curable in mid-litigation. 77  In hindsight, I see no reason why
similar communications with Congress could not have cured the
69. See, e.g., United States v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 927 F.2d 575, 579 (Fed. Cir.)
(citing Thoen v. United States, 765 F.2d 1110, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330
(1991); W.M. Schlosser Co. v. United States, 705 F.2d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Milmark
Servs. v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 954, 956 (1982); W.H. Moseley Co. v. United States, 677 F.2d
850, 852 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 836 (1982); Paul E. Lehman, Inc. v. United States, 673
F.2d 352, 355 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (holding that certification requirement isjurisdictional prerequisite
that must be satisfied by contractor before it may appeal contracting officer's claim denial).
70. See Grumman, 927 F.2d at 579 (stating that pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 605 (1988), proper
certification by contractor of claims over $50,000 is prerequisite to contracting officer having
jurisdiction to render final decision on claims).
71. See id. at 578-80 (stating that 41 U.S.C. § 609(a) makes final decision of contracting
officer prerequisite to appeal to Court of Federal Claims).
72. Id. at 580.
73. SeeBender v. WilliamsportArea Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534,541 (1986) (holding that every
federal appellate court has "special obligation" to determine validity ofjurisdiction).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1988) ("Every claim of which the United States Claims Court has
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problem many years earlier. Our court has traditionally shunned such
communication with Congress, however, for fear of appearing to
interfere with legislative prerogatives. I think we should reexamine
our position of total silence. Of course, our court should express no
opinion with regard to policy choices Congress faces, but we could
properly advise the legislature on the effect of a given legislative
change on existing jurisprudence.
VIII. POSSIBLE FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN THE WORK OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
I will first consider what outsiders can do to help the court and
then what the court can do to help itself.
A. Appointments by the President
Selecting judges is not part of our court's mission. Nevertheless,
one factor that I think should be considered may not occur to those
who are responsible for helping select potential appointees.
Therefore, I will be bold enough to suggest that the President
consider filling our long existing vacancy with another patent litigator,
ideally one experienced in trying infringement cases to juries. At
present, our bench includes judges with varied professional back-
grounds, which provides the court with great intellectual strength.
One area of professional expertise that the court lacks, however, is
that of a patent litigator. While four of eleven active judges had
extensive prior experience with intellectual property matters-nearly
exactly the proportion of our total caseload that involves intellectual
property issues7--not one had substantial patent infringement jury
experience. Accordingly, the most important gap in our collective
experience concerns district courtjuries in infringement cases. If not
a patent jury litigator, then perhaps the President might consider
appointing a district court judge who has presided over many patent
jury trials.
A fitting choice to fill the next vacancy would be an experienced
government contracts litigator. After all, cases that originate in both
the Court of Federal Claims and over a dozen departmental boards
of contract appeals form a significant proportion of our case-
load-approaching twenty percent.7  The field of government
contracts is a legal specialty with rules as arcane as those in patent
78. See Clerk's Office of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Year-to-Date Activity
and Status of Pending Cases (Feb. 1994) (unpublished statistical compilation).
79. Id.
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law, and with damage awards potentially as large as in patent cases.
Presently, our active membership includes only one judge who
possesses significant experience with government contract litigation.
Several senior judges who have extensive experience adjudicating
these cases have greatly strengthened our decisionmaking process and
enlightened our internal debate in such cases. Unfortunately, these
judges will not be with us forever. These judges were originally
appointed to the Court of Claims, which was more specialized than
was the Federal Circuit, and they have a strong base of expertise, built
up over the course of their years on the bench. Ultimately, that
strength should be replenished. While it is certainly not our role to
tell a President who should be appointed, I see no problem in
informing him of advising gaps, both present and future, in our
collective experience.
B. More Amicus Briefing by Bar Associations
I believe that more amicus briefs submitted by the various special-
ized bar groups would provide the greatest possible assistance to the
court. I expect that briefs in more cases, especially those before
panels, would improve the quality and realism of panel decisions in
certain important cases that raise fundamental issues regardless of the
subject matter involved. Sometimes different associations in the same
area will have different views. The court would benefit from such
diversity of opinion.
At present, amicus participation is largely limited to en banc cases.
Yet many far-reaching panel decisions are declined for en banc
rehearing. To some extent, our heavy workload is a disincentive to
accepting suggestions or acting sua sponte. Also, some members of
our court believe that en banc treatment is not justified merely
because nonpanel members would have voted differently or viewed
the decision and the precedent it represents as unwise. Certainly, the
bar cannot assume that all major decisions will be made by the full
court sitting en banc.
I have been told that the time needed to get association approval
impedes amicus participation, particularly in cases at the panel level.
But district court decisions that raise major issues are often covered
in the legal if not the lay press, and computerized services make quick
access to such decisions possible and inexpensive. Furthermore, I
expect our court would be interested in reviewing the feasibility of any
proposed amendment to facilitate timely review by potential amici.
It may even be constructive for bar associations to file petitions that
endorse a pending suggestion for en banc rehearing.
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C. More Consultation with Congressional Committees
While neither the court nor individual judges should be advocating
particular positions calculated to influence congressional policy
choices on substantive or jurisdictional legislation, I think an
exception can be made for explaining the impact of alternative
legislative proposals on the court and its jurisprudence. Advocating
is one thing, informing is another. Especially with Congress address-
ing legislation to implement treaties that would harmonize patent law
worldwide, 1994 seems an auspicious year for increasing and
formalizing the dialogue between court and committee.
D. More Research by Scholars, Especially Empirical Studies
I would like to see more issue-specific conferences presented by law
schools, especially those with a particular interest in the work of our
court. Recent conferences on patents at the George Washington
National Law Center serve as a good model. Empirical research, not
only by law school faculty but also by think tank scholars, could also
greatly assist our court. Institutions such as the Intellectual Property
Owners, Brookings Institute, and RAND Corporation could make
important contributions. Such studies could then be cited in amicus
and party briefs to ensure that the court's decisions reflect proven
cause and effect relationships rather than assumed ones.
E. What Our Court Itself Can Do: Become More
Consultative and Orderly
Until the last six months, my principal proposal for improving our
service to the bars, the industries, and the agencies affected by our
decisions would have been for more cases to be decided en banc. In
late 1993, however, this suggestion became moot as the court's active
judges voted to consider en banc no fewer than ten appeals. That is
many more than in earlier years. From 1988, when I was appointed,
through 1992, I doubt we took ten cases en banc. I am hopeful that
whatever the extra burden on the court or the bar, the level of
dissonance will thereby be diminished. Certainly, en banc decisions
in these cases may modify our precedent in problematic subject areas,
such as the doctrine of equivalents and claim construction, discussed
above. Hopefully, the en banc decisions will increase predictability.
Two more modest suggestions, however, have not become moot.
First, I wonder if the several means of informal communication with
our various bars-panels, conferences, speeches, journal articles, and
Inn of Court meetings-might not be profitably supplemented by
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actual "consultations," meetings that focus not on individual cases but
generically on selected common and troublesome issues. In past
years, the Federal Circuit Bar Association's mid-winter meeting
included small discussion groups that mixed together judges,
practitioners, and others. I found these candid exchanges most
enlightening. Another model might be the semi-annual consultation
organized with major patent litigators by the district judges in
Wilmington. This roundtable after-dinner discussion with agenda but
no press or audience seems well suited to respectful and helpful
exchanges. The prominence of the practitioners who attend-coming
from New York, Chicago, Washington, and elsewhere-suggests that
they find the format useful. The fact that the judges continue to
convene these sessions suggests that they do as well. Our court
should consider convening such groups. Although we have an
excellent Advisory Committee, its work has traditionally concerned
procedure, not substantive law, so there is a gap to fill.
Second, the court might institute procedures to consolidate or
suspend appeals that raise the same issue of first impression. At
present, such appeals are automatically and randomly assigned to
various panels as soon as briefing is completed. Consequently,
inconsistent decisions can and do issue, needlessly raising the level of
dissonance and increasing pressure for en banc rehearing. Some sort
of advance screening, perhaps by a rotating panel of judges, could
either consolidate such appeals or suspend later ones until the first
appeal decides the new issue. Such a panel could also better allocate
argument time. Currently, we sometimes hear argument in cases in
which argument is not helpful. On the other side of the coin, in
certain complex patent or other cases, twenty minutes may not be
enough time for argument. I for one would like to avoid argument
in simple cases where no new legal issues, as opposed to purely factual
ones, are raised and to increase argument time in major cases.
CONCLUSION
Improving predictability and avoiding dissonance will require the
court to obtain a deeper understanding of the actual operation of the
companies and agencies governed by our decisions, as well as the
practical impact of our rulings. If the appellate process, invented
before the start of the present century, is to serve well in the next
century, more, better, and broader information and argument must
be presented to courts. To a great extent, despite computerization,
prevailing rules of judicial notice prevent the court itself from
properly searching out and using such information: it must come
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from both party and amicus briefs. In turn, the court must adjust its
internal practices to avoid inconsistencies and reduce uncertainties.
We should also welcome, praise, and use the contributions of scholars
and amici.
Ironically, in a profession based on effective communication, what
is needed, in my view, is more and better communication all around.
Above all, the court needs a broader spectrum of input if it is to
better align future decisions with the realities of the institutions
affected by its decisions. It is interesting, too, that no matter how
great our statutory and constitutional powers, we are quite dependent
on the bar. We need its help and we want it-the more, the better.
As the following articles illustrate, exceptionally able lawyers
contribute to the work of our court and follow its decisions. Conse-
quently, enlarging our dialogue holds great promise.

